

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT

CD NO.

DATE DISTR. September 1955

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

THIS WAS DONE BY CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WHERE THE VIOLATION OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT OF U.S.C., 50 USC 32, IS INVOLVED. THE REVELATION OF THE REVELATION OF HIS CONFIDENTIALITY IS IN VIOLATION OF AN UNLAWFUL PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REVELATION OF THIS INFORMATION IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

1. During the 24th Plenary Session of the SED Central Committee it became known that Alfred Neumann of the SED Politburo had been forbidden to speak at the session. This had a rather depressing effect because Neumann's prestige had increased in connection with his successful operation against the rally of the so-called "Saeren-Division" in West Berlin. Discontent with the attitude of the SED leadership toward the new Soviet-German policy was also reflected in the final vote of the conference, which was taken with 34 abstentions. At the conclusion of the meeting, Wilhelm Pieck stressed the necessity for unity, which alone could achieve the victory of the national cause.
2. In private discussions during pauses in the negotiations, the result of the Warsaw conference was criticized. It was pointed out that this conference had revealed the provisional status of the GDR and the fact that the Soviet-German policy was not based on principles but on opportunist considerations. The realization that the GDR was mainly a pawn within the framework of over-all Soviet policies which were exclusively dominated by national interests came as a shock to many SED leaders. Many of them expressed the fear that this situation would bring about a deep crisis for the SED and East German labor generally.
3. The 23 speakers who took part in discussions during the 24th Plenary Session of the SED Central Committee had been carefully selected and screened by Albert Norden, who saw to it that awkward questions were not raised. The ten-point program for the reunification of Germany as put forth by Ulbricht at Pushkin's suggestion had been discussed with representatives of the bourgeois parties prior to the plenary session of the Central Committee. It appeared that Ulbricht's speech contained some obviously incorrect assertions. He stated for example that Yugoslavia was ready to resume diplomatic relations with the GDR, although it was learned that Tito had rejected this idea. Furthermore, although Pushkin had told Ulbricht that Austria had also refused to extend diplomatic recognition to the GDR, the SED chief told the conferees that Austria would soon recognize the GDR.

[illegible]

25X1

Page Denied